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THE LOGIC LINGUISTS NEED 
TO KNOW 
IAN CHRISTOPHER STIRK 
Lewis Carroll's logical problems have long provided a rich source of examples for teachers 
of logic, and there have been many more of these problems to choose from since W. W. Bartley 
III rediscovered and published more of Carroll's logical work (Bartley, 1977). 
Bartley also provides an interesting editor's introduction to this publication. In it, he 
notes a point which is often overlooked; namely, that the "Boolean" or algebraic logicians of 
the 19th century were trying to answer rather different problems from the ones which are tackled 
by modern mathematical logicians. Boole himself, it seems, defined the central problem of 
algebraic logic as follows (see Bartley, 1977, p. 22): 
"Given certain logical premises or conditions, to determine the description of any class of 
objects under those conditions." 
Contemporary logicians, on the other hand, are generally concerned with problems in the 
foundations of mathematics. These involve the construction of proofs and axiomatization, 
with the attendant split between logical syntax and semantics, and the resulting problems of 
decision procedures and their limitations. The methods used in these investigations are rather 
different from those required for the Boolean problem. 
Bartley explains the general lack of awareness of this distinction today by the Kulmian 
suggestion that 19th century algebraic logic, although certainly "revolutionary" when compared 
to the current Aristotelian variety, never had time to become a "paradigm" before the advent 
of mathematical logic in the early 1900's. (See Kuhn, 1970, for these terms.) 
I think it is clear that linguists investigating logical form are far more concerned with a 
Boolean problem that with a mathematical one. For example, consider again the classic 
illustration of Montague grammar, "John seeks a unicorn." A semantic theory should 
indicate, among other things, that this sentence may be true even if unicorns do not exist, and, 
if unicorns are necessarily animals, that it implies "John seeks an animal." Montague tackles 
the problem by translating the English sentences into an interpreted intensional logic, and 
showing that the translation has the necessary implications. This is a Boolean method: the 
axiomatizations and syntactic proof procedures of mathematical logic are not necessary for its 
success. In fact, Montague's linguistic papers do not offer any proof procedures at all, but 
rely on intuitive considerations. As for axiomatization, Montague writes in his 'Pragmatics 
and Intensional Logic', "The problem, however, of axiomatizing predicative intensional logic 
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remains open." (See Thomason, 1974, p. 144.) This lack did not hinder a solution to the 
linguistic problem. 
Despite all this, works on logic for linguists are largely based on those intended for 
mathematicians. McCawley (1981), for example, has separate chapters on syntax, preceding 
those on semantics, for propositional and predicate logic. The syntax chapters contain 
cumbersome methods of proof based on natural deduction, which despite its name, needs a good 
deal of skill and memorization to apply freely. Furthermore, the natural deductive methods 
are not used in the chapter on Montague grammar. It is noteworthy too that the syntax 
chapters of the book contain a great deal of comment on intended interpretations of the theorems 
being proved. Allwood, Andersson, and Dahl (1977) does not contain any complete method of 
proof even for lower predicate logic, although in general the authors do stress semantics rather 
than syntax. 
In what follows I shall present what I hope is a solution to the Boolean problem for linguists 
using logic. It is based on an adaptation of a proof procedure for the lower predicate calculus 
used by Quine in his (197 4). Since there is no linguistic reason to restrict myself to an axio-
matic, syntactic justification of this proof procedure, I will give only a simple semantic one. 
In a future paper I shall show how this method may easily be extended to deal with problems 
in modal and intensional logic, which I believe greatly simplifies the conceptual difficulties in-
volved in mastering Montague grammar. 
The Method 
Let us begin with the simple problem of showing that a conclusion (x) (Fx:JHx) follows 
from the two premises (x) (Gx:JHx) and (x) (Fx:JGx): a basic Aristotelian syllogism. In 
other terms, this amounts to showing that the sentence 
(x) (Gx:JHx) · (x) (Fx:JGx) · :J(x) (Fx:JHx) 
is logically true, or true under any interpretation. 
One way of showing that something is logically true is to demonstrate that its negation 
would be inconsistent, or false under any interpretation. The negation of the sentence above is 
(x) (Gx:JHx) · (x) (Fx:JGx) · -(x) (Fx:JHx). 
In other words, we would need to show that the sentence -(x) (Fx:JHx) is inconsistent with the 
two premises. 
-(x) (Fx:JHx) is equivalent to (ax) (Fx · -Hx), so the problem is to prove that the set of 
three sentences 
(1) (x) (Gx:JHx) 
(2) (x) (Fx:JGx) 
(3) (ax) (Fx · -Hx) 
is inconsistent. Sentence (3) states that there is at least one individual which is both F and 
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not-H, so let us suppose an interpretation in which an individual 'a' is one of these. So we can 
write 
(4) Fa· -Ha 
Sentences (1) and (2) contain statements which are true for all individuals in the interpretation, 




In the propositional calculus, the expression p:::Jq · q:::Jr · :::J · p:::Jr IS logically true. (In 
future, I shall assume a knowledge of the theorems of propositional calculus.) So sentences 
(5) and (6) enable us to deduce (7): 
(7) Fa:::JHa 
'Fa' is true, according to sentence ( 4) so we conclude 
(8) Ha 
But again sentence ( 4) gives us 
(9) -Ha, 
and we have arrived at a contradiction between sentences (8) and (9). 
The working shows that the conjunction of (1), (2) and (3) is inconsistent, since in any inter-
pretation which makes (1), (2) and (3) simultaneously true, there will be at least one individual 
like 'a'. The whole proof is conveniently summed up as follows: 
A. (1) (x) (Gx:::JHx) 
(2) (x) (Fx:::JGx) 
(3) (3:x) (Fx · -Hx) 
(4) Fa· -Ha (3) 
(5) Ga:::JHa (1) 
(6) Fa:::JGa (2) 
(7) Fa:::JHa (5), (6) 
(8) Ha (7), ( 4) 
(9) -Ha (4) 
The numbers to the right of a line show from which lines it was inferred. 
Here is an even simpler proof of the same sort: 
B. (1) (x)Fx 
(2) (3:x)-Fx 
(3) -Fa (2) 
(4) Fa (1) 
55 





Now consider a conjunction (ax)Fx · (ax)-Fx. This should not be inconsistent, of course. 
Some things may consistently be F while others are not-F. In that case, the following pur-
ported proof of inconsistency must be wrong: 






The mistake lies in instantiating both lines (1) and (2) with the same individual 'a'-this is 'unfair' 
to the premises, which only assert that some are F and some are not-F, not that some are both F 
and not-F. The remedy for this is to instantiate line (2) with a different individual, say 'b': 
D. (1) (ax)Fx 
(2) (ax)-Fx 
(3) Fa (1) 
(4) -Fb (2). 
The contradiction now disappears. 
The examples above already illustrate almost the entire proof procedure. The procedure 
is one which demonstrates inconsistency, the contradictory of logical truth. The method 
consists in 'instantiating' quantified premises, using as few instances as possible, but observing 
always the rule that each new existential quantifier must be instantiated with a new instance. 
When the quantifiers have been removed, a contradiction is sought among the instantiated 
lines, which is a simple problem now in propositional calculus. If there is a contradiction, 
that means that the original premises are inconsistent. Clearly keeping the instances as few 
as possible increases the chances of finding a contradiction: compare C and D above. 
I will now give further examples of the use of the method with a commentary to illustrate 
and justify it. 
The first example shows that (y) (ax)Fxy follows from (ax) (y)Fxy. The negation of 
(y) (ax)Fxy is (ay) (x)-Fxy. So we need to show that the conjunction of premisses 
E. (1) (ax) (y)Fxy 
(2) (ay) (x)-Fxy 
is inconsistent. 
The existential quantifiers are instantiated differently, since they do not indicate that any 






The universal quantifiers may be instantiated with 'a' or 'b' or both, since they state something 
true of any individuals. Here it is obvious that a contradiction will appear if (3) is instantiated 





I am justified in concluding now that (1) and (2) are inconsistent, since 'a' and 'b' could stand for 
any individuals in any interpretation which makes (1) and (2) both true. We have therefore 
shown that 
(ax) (y)Fxy:::J(y) (ax)Fxy 
is logically true. 
Let us investigate the converse case 
(y) (ax)Fxy:::J(ax) (y)Fxy. 
The negation of the apodosis is (x) (ay)-Fxy, so we need to consider 
F. (1) (y) (ax)Fxy 
(2) (x) (ay)-Fxy 
The universal quantifiers must be instantiated first, with the same individual for economy: 
(3) (ax)Fxa 
( 4) (ay)-Fay 
(1) 
(2) 





Obviously no contradiction could be found here, so we can only conclude that (ax) (y)Fxy 
does not follow from (y) (ax)Fxy. 
Now for a more complex example. We investigate the inconsistency or otherwise of the 
following premises: 
(x) (ay)Fxy:::J(ax) (Gx · Hx) 
(x) (Hx=Kx) 
(x) (y) (Gx:::JFxy) 
(x) (y) (Gx · -Ky) 
A problem arises with the first premise, since in it there are quantifiers which do not have the 
whole sentence in their scope. Is it possible, for instance, to instantiate the first universal 
quantifier as 'a' and infer: 
(ay)Fxy:::J(ax) (Gx · Hx)? 
It is not, as a counterexample shows. Suppose that (ax) (Gx·Hx) is false m some inter-
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pretation; then, since the premise is assumed true, (x) (3:y)Fxy must also be false. But (:>ry)-
Fay might still be true, even in this case: this particular individual 'a' might make it true, 
though not all individuals do. So the premise might be true, but the instantiation false. It is 
not safe to instantiate quantifiers which do not have the whole line in their scope. 
or 
That particular premise may be written as an alternation, of course: 
-(x) (:>ry)Fxy v (:>rx) (Gx · Hx) 
(:>rx) (y)-Fxy v (:>rx) (Gx · Hx). 
In a true alternation, either one or the other side is true, or both are. So each side may be con-
joined separately with the other premises, and the inconsistency tested. If a contradiction 
arises in both cases, it must arise with the alternation as a whole. The complete working will 
make this clear: 
G. (1) (x) (Hx=Kx) 
(2) (x) (y) (Gx::J Fxy) 
(3) (x) (y) (Gx·-Ky) 




(101) (:>rx) (y)-Fxy (201) (:>rx) (Gx · Hx) 
(102) (y)-Fay (101) (202) Gb·Hb (201) 
(103) -Faa (102) (203) Hb=Kb (1) 
(104) Ga::JFaa (2) (204) Gb·-Kb (3) 
(105) Ga·-Ka (3) (205) Kb (202), (203) 
(106) Ga (105) (206) -Kb (202), (204) 
(107) Faa (104) 
contradicts (103) 
It will be seen how one side of the alternation is tested in each branch. The numbering 
system is pure convenience. A contradiction arises in both branches, so the premises (1)-( 4) 
are inconsistent. Notice how splitting up the alternation means that only quantifiers with whole 
lines in their scope are ever instantiated. Since any connective can be expressed in terms of 
negation, conjunction, and alternation, this 'branching' method can deal with any problem 
involving scope. 
Axioms and Identity 
It is of course possible to give a syntactic justification of this method, as Quine does in 
Chapter 29 of his (1974). The method itself can combine easily with an axiomatic system, to 
provide extensions of the lower predicate calculus (LPC). As an illustration, I will show how 
the method may be extended to deal with LPC plus identity. 
The following axioms are sufficient for identity: 
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(1) (x) (x=x) 
(2) (x) (y) ("x" · x=y · :::J "y") 
The second axiom expresses 'Leibniz' Law'. Here "x" stands for some sentence containing 
x, while "y" is the same sentence withy in place of x. (I am assuming, of course, restrictions to 
prevent unwanted binding of variables.) The second axiom is in fact a schema: in any parti-
cular proof, some suitable sentence replaces "x". 
Now these axioms may be added as premises where necessary in the course of a proof in-
volving identity. I will give an illustration of this. The usual logical form given for "there is 
one and only one x such that Fx" is (ax) (y) (Fy=·x=y). Allowod, Andersson and Dahl 
(1977) give the version, (ax) (y) (Fx : Fy:::J · x=y). Are these equivalent? In other words, 
we wish to see if the equivalence 
(ax) (y) (Fy= · x=y) =(ax) (y) (Fx: Fy :::J · 
is logically true. 
Since q) is equivalent to p.-q.v.-p.q, there is an alternation right at the start, neces-
sitating two separate proofs. First, let us test 
H. (1) (ax) (y) (Fx: Fy:::J · x=y) 
(2) (x) (ay) (Fy · x:;t:y- v ·-Fy · x=y) 
(2) is the negation of (ax) (y) (Fy= · x=y). It is of course best to begin by instantiating the 
existential quantifier, to economize instances as much as possible. The proof proceeds as 
follows: 
(3) (y) (Fa: Fy:::J · a=y) (1) 
(4) (ay) (Fy·a:;t:y·v·-Fy-a=y) (2) 
(5) Fb ·a:;t:b ·v·-Fb·a=b (4) 
(6) Fa: Fb:::J ·a=b (3) 
(7) Fb ·a:;t:b·v· -Fb · a=b (5) 
---(101) ·a:;t:b (201) -Fb· .a=b 
(102) Fb:::J ·a=b (6) (202) Fa (6) 
(103) a=b (101), (102) 
(104) a:;t:b (101) 
The alternation is conveniently dealt with by branching in this case too. The left hand 
branch leads to a contradiction anyway, but not the right. An axiom may conveniently be 
introduced at this point, namely, the second axiom, with the schema instantiated like this: 
(x) (y) (Fx · x=y · :::J Fy) 
The right hand branch then continues as follows: 
(203) (x) (y) (Fx · x=y · :::J Fy) 






That provides the necessary contradiction. 
(201), (202), (204) 
(201) 
The other proof needed to establish the equivalence is given below. Here Axiom 1 is 
needed. 
I. (1) (ax) (y) (Fy= · x=y) 
(2) (x) (:>Iy) (-Fx v· Fy·x*y) 
(3) (y) (Fy= · a=y) (1) 
(4) (:;Iy) (-Fa v · Fy · a*y) (2) 
(5) -Fav·Fb·a*b (4) 
(6) Fb= ·a=b (3) 
(7) -Fav·Fb·a*b (5) 
~~~ 
(101) Fb·a*b (201) -Fa 
(102) Fb (101) (202) Fa= ·a=a (3) 
(103) a=b (6) (203) (x) (x=x) Axiom 
(104) a*b (101) (204) a=a (203) 
(205) Fa (202), (204) 
contradicts (201) 
So the two versions of the formula are equivalent. It is sometimes convenient to save axioms 
until they are needed, as here, instead of including them among the other premises. This 
enables one to see precisely when and why they are needed. 
Since identity axioms can be introduced in this way, it is clear that axioms for modal logic 
and set theory could be similarly dealt with. However, I will leave this to a future paper in 
which the general method will be applied to the full apparatus of intensional logic. 
The Boolean Problem 
If I stopped at this point, I might be accused of not having solved the Boolean problem. 
I have provided a mechanical test for validity, but no method for determining just what follows 
from a collection of logical premises, which the Boolean problem requires. However, there 
can be no decision procedure for this general problem, as far as I know. What the method 
does for you is to give a mechanical test for your guesses of what follows from a set of premises. 
That is a great deal, and as much as you could expect, I think, especially in such fields as in-
tensional logic. 
The method can often give important clues about "missing" premises, though. I give a 
simple example below. 
J. (1) (x) (Gx:::}Hx) 
(2) (x) (Fx:::}Gx) 
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(3) (x) (Fx:::J-Hx) 
(4) Ga:::JHa (1) 
(5) Fa:::JGa (2) 
(6) Pa:::J-Ha (3) 
(7) Fa:::JHa (4), (5) 
There is no contradiction here as it stands, but clearly the addition of a line 'Fa' 
would cause one. The weakest premise 'Fa' could come from would be '(ax)Fx', which would 
of course be instantiated first. 
So the method can guide guesses as well as test them. There will be more examples of 
this in the sequel to this paper. 
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